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1571 
A HISTORY OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY’S 
ACCESSION TO POWER 
Michael R. Kuhn† 
The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea. 
By John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge. 
Modern Library, 2003.  191 pages.  $19.95. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Enron.  WorldCom.  Tyco.  It has not been unusual in the 
years following the collapse of the energy-trading firm, Enron, to 
pick up one’s morning paper to discover a corporate officer being 
led away from an office building in handcuffs or charged with the 
white-collar crimes of embezzlement, fraud, or obstruction of 
justice.1  While “perp walks” such as these serve to mollify a jittery 
investor class, as a structural force and a decision-making entity, 
two writers from the magazine The Economist, John Micklethwait 
and Adrian Wooldridge, believe such arrests might also signal a 
transformation in how our society views the corporation.  In 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge’s book, The Company: A Short History 
of a Revolutionary Idea, the two condense 5000 years of the 
development of what they call “joint stock companies” into a 
concise, readable history of one of our society’s foremost powers.  
The authors conclude that, despite abuses of the corporate form 
 
†     J.D., 2002, cum laude, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., cum laude, 
Saint John’s University.  Michael specializes in corporate mergers and acquisitions 
at Lindquist & Vennum, PLLP in Minneapolis. 
 1. See, e.g., Constance L. Hays & Leslie Eaton, The Martha Stewart Verdict: The 
Overview, Stewart Found Guilty of Lying in Sale of Stock, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2004, at 
A1 (reporting that Martha Stewart was found guilty of conspiracy, obstruction of 
justice and giving false statements to authorities in connection with her sale of 
ImClone stock); Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Skilling Is Indicted by U.S. in Fraud Inquiry, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at A1 (recounting how former Enron Corp. CEO Jeffrey 
Skilling was taken to court in handcuffs and charged with three dozen counts of 
fraud, insider trading, and other crimes in an indictment stemming from Enron’s 
collapse). 
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such as those seen in the Enron or WorldCom scandals, the joint 
stock company is still the most important and powerful 
organization in the world. 
II. OVERVIEW 
The Company explores the relatively rapid development of the 
modern corporation and, in turn, examines that entity’s 
emergence as the dominant form of economic organization.  
Micklethwait and Wooldridge begin their analysis of that question 
in Mesopotamia in 3000 B.C. and quickly cover 4500 years of 
economic development, from the family merchants who traded 
along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers to the societates of Rome, to 
the current technology companies found in Silicon Valley.2  The 
two observe common themes in many of these business 
organizations, such as the quest for limited liability and the pooling 
of investor resources to limit risk allocations. 
Interestingly, one of the themes that Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge mine as an apt comparison to today’s modern 
corporation is the level of governmental involvement or, at times, 
acquiescence in a particular entity’s operations.3  In the Middle 
Ages, guilds were the dominant form of business organization.  
These entities resembled modern trade unions4 by operating 
umbrella groups for members of particular crafts.5  As guilds 
became increasingly powerful organizations, the crown became 
concerned because “they circumvented feudal fees by never dying, 
never coming of age, and never getting married.”6  The sovereign, 
however, would not be denied its revenue.  Typically, the crown 
granted guilds a monopoly to operate within the confines of a city’s 
walls in exchange for substantial monetary “donations.”7  Another 
source of royal revenue was to call in the guilds’ charters for 
 
 2. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT AND ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 3-4 (2003) [hereinafter “MICKLETHWAIT & 
WOOLDRIDGE”]. 
 3. Id. at 13. 
 4. Id. at 13. 
 5. See, e.g., TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA 19 (2003).  Nace discusses guilds 
such as the Skinners, the Fishmongers, the Goldsmiths, the Grocers, the Drapers, 
the Mercers, the Tailors, the Saddlers, the Haberdashers, the Cordwainers, the 
Merchant Tailors, the Salters, the Ironmongers, the Vintonners, and the 
Clothmakers.  Id. at 19-20. 
 6. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 13. 
 7. Id. 
2
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renewal as a method to collect additional fees.8  Thus, although 
nervous about the power certain guilds wielded, the sovereign 
became crucial to their development by offering security and the 
promise of a guaranteed market.9 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge also explore the interaction of 
government and business in the chartering of voyages in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Companies chartered by 
individual countries10 popularized the modern concepts of limited 
liability and the pooling of capital.  Due to the high level of risk 
involved in backing such expeditions to the far corners of the 
modern globe, financiers of such voyages sought to spread their 
capital among a number of voyages and fleets.11  With pooled 
capital, investors were for the first time detached from the actual 
individuals constituting the corporation.12  This emerging idea 
would come to transform the idea of a corporation as a legal entity 
existing apart from its owners. 
With rampant financial speculation in early joint-stock 
companies, inevitable market corrections and “bubbles” developed 
similar to ones that can also be seen in today’s markets.  In one 
investment debacle, Micklethwait and Wooldridge recount how 
John Law (1671-1729) intended to rescue France from its inflation 
problems and unstable currency.13  Law allowed investors to buy 
shares in the Mississippi Company in installments, providing loans 
from the Banque Royale and using the shares as security.14  Few 
investors questioned what Law’s company actually did because Law 
controlled both the central bank and the stock market.15  In 1720, 
 
 8. NACE, supra note 5, at 21. 
 9. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 14.  The authors liken such 
a guaranteed market to present-day defense contractors that obtain similar 
security measures and guarantees of a fixed market from the United States 
Department of Defense.  Id. 
 10. Columbus, Magellan, and Vasco da Gama were all “recipients of royal 
charters that gave them exclusive rights to trade with this or that bit of the world.”  
MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 17. 
 11. Id. at 20.  The authors compare the risks of investing in spice missions to 
Indonesia to those that would invest in space exploration today. Id. at 19. 
 12. The London-based Virginia Company, which helped found the 
Jamestown Colony in what would become the United States, counted among its 
“Adventurers” (investors who purchased a twelve-pound share) “wealthy aristocrats 
and merchants but also such notables as William Shakespeare.”  NACE, supra note 
5, at 31. 
 13. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 28-31. 
 14. Id. at 30. 
 15. Id. 
3
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Law’s bubble burst when a number of investors abandoned the 
Mississippi Company.16  He was forced to flee the country, “leaving 
France in chaos.”17 
The chapters detailing the period between 1850 and 1900, 
however, are where Micklethwait and Wooldridge’s narrative 
excels.  It is at this point that the United States used state-charted 
corporations with special monopoly rights to build some of the vital 
infrastructure of the new country and to separate itself from what 
would be a more traditional, stakeholder view of the corporation 
evident in Europe. 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge contend that three events 
converged to prompt the “revolutionary” change in the 
corporation in the United States.18  The first, and most important, 
innovation was the railroad.19  Railroads were not just the first 
modern businesses; they also enabled the development of other 
companies, “helped build . . . the infrastructure of a modern 
economy,” “provided the right-of-way for telegraph and telephone 
lines” and “revolutionized the Post Office,” and made it possible to 
move goods throughout the country quickly and predictably.20  One 
early beneficiary of the railroad revolution was Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., which used the rails to ship mail-order products to remote 
locales across the country.21 
The second change that affected the company’s role in the 
United States was legal.  Beginning in 1819, the Supreme Court 
held in a ruling regarding the status of Dartmouth College that 
states could not rewrite corporate charters capriciously because the 
corporation possessed certain private rights.22  Subsequently, 
numerous constitutional rights previously accorded only to private 
citizens were extended to corporations as well.23 
 
 16. Id. at 30-31 
 17. Id. at 31. 
 18. Id. at 45. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 62-63. 
 21. Id. at 57-58. 
 22. Id. at 45.  Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 
(1819), is also important because it was the first case in which the Supreme Court 
indicated that the Constitution, which makes no mention of corporations, could 
be interpreted liberally enough to give corporations some constitutional 
protections.  Justice Marshall also made clear, however, that corporations remain 
subject to state power, writing that the corporation is an “artificial being, invisible, 
intangible and existing only in contemplation of law.” 
 23. The following constitutional rights were extended to corporations: 
4
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The final prompt was political in nature.24  State restrictions on 
incorporation in the early nineteenth century bore little 
resemblance to today’s general incorporation laws.  But beginning 
in 1830, states began considering the impact that pro-business 
statutes could have on a state’s ability to attract corporations to 
relocate within their borders.  In 1830, Massachusetts decided that 
companies didn’t have to be engaged in public works to be 
awarded a state charter.25  In 1837, Connecticut allowed 
incorporation of most businesses without a special legislative 
enactment.26  Finally, in a decision heavily lobbied for by the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, the State of New Jersey loosened its 
incorporation rules so that any corporation chartered in the state 
could hold stock in any other corporation in the country.27  This 
1899 revision of New Jersey law soon made it the preferred state in 
which to incorporate.  By 1901, seventy-one percent of all United 
States corporations with assets of $25 million or greater were 
founded in New Jersey, i.e., the legal recognition of the holding 
 
County of Santa Clara v. S. Pac., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (the right to equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. v. 
Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (the right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Noble v. Union River Logging R.R.. Co., 147 U.S. 165 (1893) (the 
right to Fifth Amendment protections); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (the 
right to freedom from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment); 
Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908) (the right to a jury trial 
in a criminal case under the Sixth Amendment); Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393 (1922) (the right to compensation for governmental takings under the 
Fifth Amendment); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (the right to 
freedom from double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment); Ross v. Bernhard, 
396 U.S. 531 (1970) (the right to a jury trial in a civil case under the Seventh 
Amendment); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 
(1976) (the right to engage in commercial speech under the First Amendment); 
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (the right to engage in 
political speech under the First Amendment); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (the right to abstain from association with the speech 
of others under the First Amendment). 
 24. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 45. 
 25. Id. at 46. 
 26. Id. 
 27. NACE, supra note 5, at 67.  Nace details the importance of this 
development by showing that the amendment made it legal for companies to 
operate outside of the boundaries of a particular state that had licensed it to do 
business.  By using the idea of a holding company, an entity formed specifically to 
own stock in other companies, corporations were able to avoid state protectionist 
statutes that limited the companies that could do business within their 
jurisdictions.  NACE, supra note 5, at 62.  A holding company is a “company formed 
to control other companies, usually confining its role to owning stock and 
supervising management.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (7th ed. 1999). 
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company.28  Soon after, other states fought back beginning a “race 
to the bottom,” eventually won by Delaware.29  By the time of the 
Great Depression, Delaware was home to one-third of the industrial 
corporations trading on the New York Stock Exchange30 and it 
continues to be home to the world’s most powerful businesses. 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge conclude that these factors—the 
development of railroads, the rise of “corporate” legal rights, and 
increasingly lenient incorporation statutes—combined with the 
American ambivalence to big business to create a ripe environment 
in which conglomerates such as Ford Motor Co., General Electric 
Co., American Tobacco, Coca-Cola, and others flourished.  By 
European standards, America was much less likely to regulate big 
businesses because 
[m]ost Americans were ambivalent about business.  They 
dislike concentrations of corporate power—the United 
States, after all, is based on the division of power—but 
they admired the sheer might of business.  They disliked 
the wealth of businessmen, but they admired the fact that 
so many of them came from nothing . . . .31 
Americans looked at the rise in corporate power as a cost-
benefit equation in which the comforts that business had made 
possible outweighed the sometimes corrupt practices used to 
deliver such luxuries.32  By improving standards of living for all 
citizens and helping to establish social services such as museums, 
parks, and art galleries in a country that was in need of such 
philanthropy, the authors argue that it “bound the classes together” 
even as “the income gap was widening.”33 
The authors also interestingly contrast the successes of the 
American system of corporate organization against those that 
involved Britain, Japan, and Germany.  The conclusion drawn is 
that Britain suffered partially from a society-wide “snobbish 
distaste” for business and entrepreneurs that had the result of 
starving British businesses of educated recruits and up-to-date 
 
 28. NACE  supra note 5, at 68. 
 29. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 68-69.  Virginia was called 
a “snug harbour for roaming and piratical corporations,” the New York legislature 
enacted a special charter to prevent General Electric Co. from moving to New 
Jersey, and Delaware substantially liberalized its corporation laws.  Id. 
 30. Id. at 69. 
 31. Id. at 74. 
 32. Id. at 77. 
 33. Id. 
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expertise.34  Japan, meanwhile, clung to family-organized zaibatsu 
(literally, “financial cliques”) until the Second World War.35  But 
the Japanese government’s “habit of steering the economy in 
pursuit of national greatness reached an ugly zenith in the Second 
World War.”36  Soon after the war ended, the Japanese began 
transitioning away from the inflexible zaibatsu and closer to the 
American model.  Finally, Germany was able to recruit more highly 
skilled workers than Britain due to the country’s emphasis on a 
scientific and vocational education,37 but it also suffered from the 
government’s insistence that businesses serve the country’s interests 
as a whole.  While appealing in an ideal society, Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge assert that in both Germany and Japan, the focus on 
the state’s goals rather than the company and its shareholders’ 
interests led to tragic results when nationalists forced businesses to 
provide resources to the war machine.38 
In the last half of the twentieth century, Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge contend both that the company experienced its 
highest level of power but that it is now undergoing an 
“unbundling” of its influence.  First, the American “multidivisional” 
firm, in which companies were divided into multiple divisions 
subject only to a central authority, was implemented in many 
companies.  This segmentation created flexibility in large 
companies and propelled entities that adopted such an 
organization to the forefront of their respective industries.39  
Competing businesses fell behind as the increased efficiency and 
growth of firms that marshaled their combined divisions together 
 
 34. Id. at 84. 
 35. Id. at 97. The zaibatsu operated as a type of holding company that 
managed a number of other firms through co-ownership and overlapping 
directorates.  Id.  Typically, the zaibatsu would recruit non-family managers directly 
from universities who would work for the extended family of companies the rest of 
their lives.  Id. 
 36. Id. at 98. 
 37. Id. at 94. 
 38. Id. at 91, 98-99. 
 39. Id. at 104-107.  The authors explain that Alfred Sloan (1875-1966) first 
implemented the multidivisional firm at General Motors.  Id. at 105.  Sloan 
decided that each of GM’s divisions was too distinct to be run by a central 
authority, so he created separate units—car, truck, parts, and accessories—to 
operate as autonomous divisions.  Id. at 105-06.  By combining the divisions 
together for purposes of buying power, GM was able to obtain economies of scale 
in all the products it purchased.  Id. at 106.  General Electric, United States 
Rubber, Standard Oil and U.S. Steel, among others, eventually adopted the 
multidivisional structure.  Id. at 107. 
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for joint-buying clout secured cheaper prices from “everything 
from steel to stationery.”40 
Although the development of the multidivisional company 
produced increased efficiencies, the authors maintain that the last 
twenty-five years has seen an unbundling of the company as 
corporations have been forced to focus on their core 
competencies.  The change has resulted in smaller, more flexible 
companies exploding out of Silicon Valley and quickly ascending 
the Fortune 500 list.  Indeed, the dot-com emphasis on informal 
relationships and entrepreneurial activity rather than staid, 
traditional companies has made “it ever easier for small 
companies—or just collections of entrepreneurs—to challenge the 
dominance of big companies; and ever more tempting for 
entrepreneurs to enter into loose relationships with other 
entrepreneurs rather than to form long-lasting corporations.”41  
Essentially, the goal today is not to form a company that could grow 
to become an empire on the scale of Coca-Cola or Ford.  Rather, 
the emphasis among business and technology school graduates is 
on entrepreneurialism—forming a smaller start-up company with 
one great idea. 
III. CRITIQUE 
The Company is a successful book inasmuch as it achieves what 
it sets out to do—provide a “short” historical view of the entity 
known as the joint stock company.  But Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge clearly paint a rosy history of the company: 
The central good of the joint-stock company is that it is 
the key to productivity growth in the private sector: the 
best and easiest structure for individuals to pool capital, to 
refine skills, and to pass them on.  We are all richer as a 
result.42 
Little in the way of labor rights, political machinations, legal 
excess, or whom the company should ultimately serve—the 
shareholders that constitute it or society that grants it a license to 
 
 40. Id. at 106-07.  Ford Motors was one such company that resisted the 
change to market segmentation and paid for it.  By 1929, Ford’s market share fell 
to 31 percent while GM’s had risen from 17 to 32.2 percent.  Id. at 107 (citing 
ALFRED CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 53 
(1990)). 
 41. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 185. 
 42. Id. at 190. 
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conduct business — is addressed.43  Indeed, although the authors 
touch on the criticism that current multinational conglomerates 
wield increasingly more power in a variety of social and economic 
ways, they conclude that such arguments are overblown.  After all, 
companies still must obtain “a franchise from society, and the terms 
of that franchise still matter enormously.”44  It is this selfishness, 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge assert, that ironically keeps 
businesses from acting solely for themselves.  Because companies 
are consistently establishing a relationship of trust with the societies 
in which they do business, and they continue to seek to obtain the 
top talent in their field from those societies, companies have “a 
vested interest in being seen to do good.”45 
But the authors neglect to address that even if the marketplace 
punishes unsuccessful and corrupt companies, these companies 
often take down shareholders with them.  Thus, while the legal 
entities known as Enron and WorldCom appropriately paid the 
price for pursuing illegitimate business practices, the sums of their 
parts are left holding the bag. 
In addition, while our society today is thought to be in a 
second Gilded Age, The Company only tangentially mentions the 
increasingly disparate compensation gap between executives and 
employees,46 the internationalization of “blue” and “white” collar 
jobs,47 or whether the spate of billion-dollar mergers will again 
 
 43. For an examination of the corporate system as it relates to focusing on 
profits for stockholders to the exclusion of all else, see MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE 
RIGHT OF CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE CORPORATE ARISTOCRACY (2001).  Kelly 
contends that the primary focus in modern corporations to maximize shareholder 
returns is flawed.  She argues that a new model for the corporation that examines 
both external and internal constituents is needed in order for companies to reflect 
American democratic political ideals. 
 44. Id. at 186. 
 45. Id. at 189.  Micklethwait and Wooldridge conclude that the robber barons 
built much of America’s educational and health infrastructure: Merck has donated 
millions in AIDS education, Avon is one of the world’s largest breast cancer 
investors, and IBM is a “strategic investor in education.”  Id. at 188-89. 
 46. See, e.g., John A. Byrne, How to fix Corporate Governance, BUSINESS WEEK, 
May 6, 2002, at 68 (stating that in 1980, the average CEO of a large corporation 
earned forty-two times the average hourly worker’s pay; by 2001, the ratio had 
increased to 411 times). 
 47. See, e.g., Stephen Baker & Manjeet Kripalani, Will Outsourcing Hurt 
America’s Supremacy?, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 1, 2004, at 84 (estimating that in the 
past three years, outsourced programming jobs have risen from 27,000 to an 
estimated 80,000 and that by the end of 2004, one out of every ten jobs in U.S. 
tech companies will move to emerging markets); The Great Hollowing-Out Myth, THE 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 2004, at 28 (citing a report by Forrester Research estimating 
9
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reshape the company as we know it.48 
Asking a relatively brief historical book to do all these things 
and more, however, admittedly is a bit unfair.  Reading The 
Company, while enlightening, is much like enrolling in an 
introductory-level survey class of American history.  While there are 
extraordinarily interesting events to discuss, the depth of coverage 
must necessarily be thin or incomplete in order to appropriately 
address the time span being examined.  Thus, while those 
interested in a brief overview of the development of the corporate 
form will not be disappointed, others may be left asking for more.  
Crafting a history that is, in this reviewer’s mind, too short, is in 
itself potentially a good thing.  After all, there are numerous other 
resources one can consult to delve more deeply into any neglected 
areas.  By authoring a concise and eminently fascinating review of 
the turbulent past of this business organization, Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge have begun the discussion regarding the terms upon 
which society should do business with the companies that prove so 





that 3.3 million American service-industry jobs will have gone overseas by 2015). 
 48. Micklethwait and Wooldridge do comment on the increased regulatory 
oversight of companies in the post-Enron business environment.  In their opinion, 
because the vast majority of Americans are now currently holders of some business 
securities in one form or another, such regulations will unlikely severely cripple 
companies’ performance but seek mainly to provide improved oversight.  
MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 156. 
10
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